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Introduction
The rising attention of politicians as well as scientists in the EU for the large urban agglomerations functioning as national and international economic hubs and growth centres (Kraetke 2007) is accompanied by political efforts to optimize their spatial organisation and to improve their standing in the worldwide locational competition. This trend leads to efforts to identify and to demarcate such agglomerations under the label 'metropolitan regions' ('Metropolregionen'). Unlike the US American SMSAs these metropolitan regions are no statistical units, but are based on voluntary unions of several territorial jurisdictions, including large cities, smaller cities and counties adjacent to them.
The actors in such newly defined metropolitan regions usually have the option to respond proactively by means of 'bottom up' initiatives, or, in case of lacking 'bottom up' activities, to react to 'top down' stimuli set by national or regional governments. In this context the very decision at the national level to lay down a certain number of metropolitan regions may work as an initiating 'top down' stimulus.
Starting from an actor-oriented perspective, these political efforts directed to establish metropolitan regions confront the actors in these territorial jurisdictions with new and added challenges. These challenges refer to their capability and propensity for cooperation crossing borders of municipalities as well as of administrative departments. So municipalities find themselves in a situation similar to private firms considering to start network relations with other firms. 1 From this point of view the capability to cooperate represents a basic and scarce resource in the course of constituting a metropolitan region. The reflections to follow will focus on the question what conditions ease or complicate cooperation between municipalities with reference to building metropolitan regions. This question will be exemplified at the metropolitan region 'Saxony Triangle' strived for in the southern part of East Germany comprising the Saxonian cities Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, and Halle in Saxony-Anhalt.
The polycentric structure of the researched 'Saxony Triangle' on the one hand fuels the assumption that in this case the resource of capability to cooperate will play a more critical role in the process of region-building as in monocentric regions. On the other hand
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The sections of this paper are structured as follows: In Section 2 a conceptual and theoretical framework is developed, and some factors conducive and obstructive to cooperation are discussed. In Section 3 the process of region-building in the 'Saxony Triangle' is compared with a sequence of typical steps having been passed through in other European metropolitan regions. Section 4 presents the results of an analysis of processes of economic specialisation within the 'Saxony Triangle'. The conclusions in Section 5 centre around the question if there are political options to speed up the process of regionbuilding on the metropolitan level. 
Regional Economics
From the view of regional economics the concept of metropolitan regions presents itself as a political construct aiming to intensify (positive) agglomeration effects and to make them effective for a larger region beyond the administrative borders of the agglomerations themselves. These two targets of intensification and extension are based on the assumption that agglomerations as a rule involve a potential of agglomeration effects still unrealized (1) in size and (2) in range. The special quality of an agglomeration serving as a centre for a metropolitan region can be estimated in relation to the degree of spatial concentration of specific functions. Metropolitan regions distinguish themselves (Blotevogel 2002) by serving
(1) as centres for economic and political decision and control. This function becomes visible by a relatively high number of firm headquarters, governmental institutions, and administrative institutions with large jurisdictions and/or outstanding spheres of responsibility located in an agglomeration.
(2) as centres for economic and social innovation and economic competition. This function is dependent on the existence of private firms and science institutions practicing research and development (R&D) as well as on the existence of wholesale markets, stock exchanges, trade fairs, exhibitions and convention centres. Institutions like these serve as market places, as nodes for the exchange of information and as opportunities for networking.
(3) as gateways that relieve a) the access to people, knowledge and markets beyond the metropolitan region, and b) the access to the metropolitan region for visitors attracted by the kind of markets, fairs and other nodes mentioned in (2). This function requires the endowment with large scale transport hubs, with infrastructures relieving the switch between different transport modes, and with modern information and communication technology.
These functions are not independent, but are interconnected by feedback loops. From the view of regional economics the functions can be conceived as indicators for agglomeration effects. For each of them hypotheses can be stated: The more pronounced the respective function in a metropolitan region, the more it supports the emergence of agglomeration effects. In addition to that the functions contain some important information how good (or bad) a metropolitan region is endowed with some locational factors being relevant for the region's standing in international locational competition. In regions with only one large agglomeration there is a high propensity that these three functions will be spatially concentrated within the agglomeration. As a consequence of this dominant position many smaller cities and counties surrounding the agglomeration will serve as locations for complementary economic and social activities that are intensely interconnected with those in the agglomeration. This position of dependence favours a 'natural' leadership of representatives of the agglomeration when decisions and problems in regional and economic development have to be met, e.g., in the case of taking steps to bring a metropolitan region into existence. These favourable preconditions tied to a basically monocentric structure do not exist in the case of regions structured in a polycentric manner. The challenge of an adequate governance for polycentric regions has created in recent years a rich literature on this topic (Lambooy 1998; Kloosterman 2001; Herrschel and Newman 2002; Meijers and Romein 2003; Bailey and Turok 2004; Meijers 2005; Hall and Pain 2006; Green 2007; Knieling et al. 2007; Meijers 2008 (Capineri and Kamann 1998) .
• The members of a club network cannot attain their goals by isolated action, but are dependent on pooling their resources with other actors. This kind of 'horizontal synergy' comes from economies of scale (Capello and Rietveld 1998) and from aligning actions to common goals.
• Web networks are characterized by actors differing in their activities. But these action are related in a complementary way, a typical trait of production chains and value added chains. The resulting 'vertical synergy' results from specialisation and from redistribution of activities between the network members according to their competences. This means, actors concentrate upon their core competences and draw back from other energy absorbing activities.
Cities in polycentric regions have the option to establish both kinds of networks. They can build club networks, if cities with similar profile are pooling their resources, e.g., in city tourism, or in offering common vocational training for industries coining a region. Camagni and Salone (1993) call these types of cooperation synergy networks. The cities of polycentric regions can also organize themselves in form of club networks or complementarity networks (ibid.), if the participating cities have different economic functions and/or dispose of complementary infrastructures. Referring to the gateway function mentioned above, the establishment of a set of complementary infrastructures may become an important development stage in a polycentric metropolitan region.
In establishing complementarity the cities as a rule are dependent on other actors like private firms, universities, chambers of industry and commerce, and trade associations. So the process of realigning the profiles of universities within a metropolitan region, for instance, can only succeed if the heads of the universities are willing to involve in the initiative for a respective metropolitan region (Meijers and Romein 2003) . Various factors affecting the capacity to negotiate between actors with divergent interests and to initiate cooperation are discussed within the domain of political science (see Section 2.2 below).
Beyond political activities pursuing the target of complementarity in a certain domain economists since Adam Smith emphasize that complementary economic structures can also evolve by means of division of labour. Some kind of spatial division of labour takes place in form of the specialisation and spatial concentration of industries (Marshall 1920; Weber 1909 ). Meijers points out that "one of the ideas behind the polycentric urban region concept is that it is not one city that provides a complete array of economic functions, urban facilities or residential and business environments, but rather the whole system of cities within a region" (2005, p. 770) . From this view complementarity is linked with agglomeration economies, because economic actors can choose from a more specialised and diverse collection of urban functions (ibid.). Such benefits of agglomerations comprise a larger labour market, the use of shopping and entertainment facilities, and a bigger supply on business service. Thereby the spatial-structure of the polycentric region may avoid the same common disadvantages of agglomerations, e.g. high land or congestions costs (Parr 2004 ). The complementarity approach will be continued in Section 4 below.
Political Science
From the perspective of political science metropolitan regions represent constellations of actors at different territorial levels and societal spheres trying to develop and to elaborate a base for cooperative behaviour. The core is constituted by municipal corporations and from case to case supplemented by actors a) from the Länder level, b) from chambers and associations with territorial spheres of responsibility transgressing those of the municipal corporations, and c) from representatives of regionally important institutions (large companies, universities, air ports, trade fair organizers).
A prerequisite for to make such constellations enduring and capable of acting is the actors' willingness to cooperate. Cooperation is the generic term for various forms of action as -listed from the least costly to the most costly one information exchange, discussion and agreement about common goals, coordinated action, conclusion of agreements, pooling resources as a prerequisite for collective action, and the professional representation of common interests in diverse policy arenas. Knieling et al. 2007, p. 59 ff.) shows typical steps and phases illustrated in Figure  1 . The starting point is an initiating 'top down' stimulus, usually set by the Federal or the appropriate Land government, or a 'bottom up' stimulus by some actor(s) of the metropolitan region. In the course of several meetings, taking place with an increasingly constant circle of actors and with increasing regularity, the participants move on to first steps of institutionalisation. The four following steps of institutionalisation (I-IV) in Figure 1 distinguish themselves by intensity and thematic range of cooperation and the degree of delegating tasks to professional expertise.
The model illustrated in Figure 1 is a trial to emphasize the similarities in various political efforts to build metropolitan regions in Europe. Its nature is primarily descriptive, and it is not demanding to serve as a 'best practise' model. Special conditions may bring a hold to the process or may, in the contrary, lead to a leapfrogging of certain steps. Nevertheless a model like this one can help to estimate the progress of a metropolitan region regarding the development of regional governance.
In the scholarly discussion focused on obstacles for regional cooperation the dimension of monocentricity -polycentricity plays an important role (Meijers and Romein 2003; Göddecke-Stellmann et al. 2005) . Metropolitan regions with monocentric structures are in the comfortable situation to dispose of an actor with high political importance and with leadership potential and legitimation in activation processes. Beyond that monocentric metropolitan regions have the starting advantage that the name of the dominating centre also serves as 'brand' for the region with the effect that tedious and conflictridden discussions become unnecessary how to name the metropolitan region.
Polycentric regions can be differentiated in regions with and regions without an outstanding centre (Knieling et al. 2007, p. 32 f.) . While the first ones find themselves in a situation comparable to monocentric regions, the last ones dispose of the least favourable preconditions for joining forces in a metropolitan region. This does not only relate to the region's branding, but also to the problem of taking a leadership role. In addition to that there is a high probability that the region will dispose of several large hub infrastructures of the same kind, e.g., air ports or railway stations. This fact complicates successful negotiations concerning the spatial bundling of these infrastructures and/or decisions to carry on one of them at the expense of other ones. Merger of municipal corporations of the metropolitan region?
Source: Authors' compilation.
In countries with a federal organisation the existence of Länder borderlines can turn out to be an additional complicating factor for cooperation within the frame of a metropolitan region. In Germany a number of metropolitan regions comprise cities and counties located in different Länder. On the one hand this fact reflects entwinement relations exceeding administrative borders. On the other hand it can complicate negotiations be-12 tween the actors of affected metropolitan regions, e.g., when they have to consider differing laws or when decisions on the (inter-)municipal level have to be confirmed by superordinate authorities at the Länder level. Frequently there is legal uncertainty in the ways municipal corporations can pursue cross-border activities on their own. There is a high probability that the existence of Länder borderlines will increase the number of actors and the number of diverging interests in the process of building a metropolitan region.
In the next section the 'Saxony Triangle' metropolitan region will be explored with regard to the step model illustrated in Figure 1 , and the factors discussed above conducive and obstructive to cooperation. The political decision to designate the 'Saxony Triangle' as a potential European metropolitan region (Figure 2 ) goes back to the 'conference of the German Länder ministries of spatial planning' in 1995 (Knieling et al. 2007, p. 2 14 process of region-building in a relatively short period to the stage of 'Institutionalisation I' specified in Figure 1 . Cooperation took place in the framework of an inter-city network comprising activities like editing brochures informing about the metropolitan region, common marketing in city tourism, or common stands at real estate exhibitions (Knieling et al. 2007, p. 2) . At this period the circle of actors was restricted to employees of the municipal authorities and did not include, e.g., managers of private firms, representatives of the chambers of industry and commerce, or heads of universities.
This process was disturbed by a further top down intervention in the form of a recommendation articulated by the 'conference of the German Länder ministries of spatial planning' in 2005 to enlarge the 'Saxony Triangle' by the cities Magdeburg and Dessau (both in Saxony-Anhalt) as well as the cities Gera, Weimar, Jena and Erfurt in Thuringia, all of them located in Central Germany ('Mitteldeutschland'). 3 This intervention resulted in several side effects: The pathway to enduring cooperation became more complicated because of a higher complexity implied by a) the (new) region's intensified polycentric structure, and b) the inclusion of cities from a third Land with a differing body of law. The reference to the region of Central Germany points to the problem that in this part of Germany besides the metropolitan region a competing concept exists how to demarcate and to define the region in an adequate way. 4 In 2008 the process of a nascent metropolitan region is still getting stuck at the 'Institutionalisation I' stage ( Figure 1 ). The office of the 'Saxony Triangle', since 2008 located at Chemnitz, is now directed by a full-time manager, but there are few signs that cooperation between the actors has intensified since 2005. Mental reservations concerning cooperation of the cities' economic development departments seem to be a crucial point: The East German cities, having regained political autonomy not until 1990, since then experienced a period of severe loss of its economic base and subsequent intense locational competition for newly investing enterprises. Against this background it becomes understandable that local promoters of urban economic development perceive the request to more cooperation as imposition, as long as they feel capable to improve the economic standing of their city by means of intensified city marketing and investment incentives. This barrier for cooperation may gradually diminish in the course of success- As an indicator for functional connections between the four leading cities of the 'Saxony Triangle', we analyze the economic patterns of the four cities. Specialisations on different sectors provide an indicator for complementary structures and therefore vertical synergies. Each city can concentrate on its specific strength and has more opportunities to generate agglomeration effects. Moreover, the other cities within the metropolitan region benefit from the stronger specialized supply in the particular sectors.
In addition to the analyses of the economic patterns, we also focus on the innovative competences of the cities of the 'Saxony Triangle'. The argumentation is analogical. If each city develops as a centre of competence in a specific technological field, a broad range of specific knowledge is present in the region, which can be seen as a source of complementarity.
Sectoral Strucure
To record the extend of economic specialisation, we use the number of employees in the various sectors. We differ between 60 sectors, according to the two-digit level of the German classification of economic activities, which meets the NACE Rev.1 classification of economic activities. The data were taken from the German National Employment Statistic, which is structured according the mentioned classification and contains the number of employees at the NUTS-3 level (see First of all we use the specialisation rate (the ratio of the share of employment in a specific industry in a region in total employment of the region and the share of total employment in the industry in total employment of a larger area, in our case Eastern Germany) to describe the general economic structure of the four cities. A specialisation rate larger than one indicates a relevance of a sector above average in a region. 
Dresden
• Radio, television and communication equipment (specialisation rate 7,9)
• Tobacco products (3,8)
• Office machinery and computers (2,1)
• Publishing and Printing (1,4)
• Other transport equipment (1,1)
• Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks (1,1)
• Chemicals and chemical products (1,0)
Chemnitz
• Textiles and textiles products (2,4)
• Machinery (2,2)
• Metal and metal products (1,6)
• Radio, television and communication equipment (1,5)
• Motor vehicles (1,3)
• Publishing and Printing (1,1)
Leipzig
• Motor vehicles (1,7)
• Publishing and Printing (1,7)
• Metal and metal products ( The results denote strong differentiations between the cities. Since Halle and Leipzig are dominated by the service sector, there are only few industrial specialisations. In contrast, Dresden and Chemnitz show specialisation on several (but dissimilar) industries. The varying economic specialisation implies differentiations in the economic role of the cities of the 'Saxony Triangle'. In addition, we apply correspondence analysis to investigate the varieties of the economic structure of the cities. Correspondence analysis is a kind of correlation analysis, with has the main purpose "to reveal the structure of a complex data matrix by replacing the raw data with a more simple data matrix without losing essential information" (Clausen 1998, p. 1) . The association between the considered categorical variables is analyzed by representing the categories of the variables as points in a low-dimensional space. Therefore, a main advantage of the method is the option of a visual presentation of the results, accompanied by a more facile interpretation. Points of a particular set that are close in space represent categories with similar distributions; points far-off represent categories with dissimilar distributions. Moreover, it is feasible to interpret the correspondence between different sets of points. In this case, not the specific distance between points from different sets, but the relative position of a point in relation to any points of the other set should be considered. Besides the geome-trical display we refer to the concept of total inertia. The total inertia is a measure of variance and quotes the extent to which the profile points spread around the average profile. The higher the total inertia, the higher are the overall differences between the set of categorical variables. For a (non-technical) introduction to the method see Clausen (1998) .
In our case, correspondence analysis meets two tasks. First of all, it reveals similarities of the economic structures of the cities of the 'Saxony Triangle'. The relative position of the cities in the presented two-dimensional plots reflects the association of the economic role of the cities. Moreover, we examine the configuration of cities and economic activities. Thereby we identify which tasks are realised in the particular cities. Secondly, we investigate the development of varieties of the economic structure, by comparing the associations between the cities in 2003 and in 2007. The closeness of the points presenting the cities Leipzig and Halle indicates the similarity of the economic structure of both cities. Indeed, both of them are characterised by a domination of the service sector and shows specialisation on insurance, real estate (see Figure 3) as well as finance, education, and health (for clarity not considered in Figure 3) . Interestingly, both cities also show a high proximity in geographical terms __________________________________________________________________ IWH IWH-Diskussionspapiere 6/2009 19 (see Figure 2) . That indicates that twin cities like Leipzig and Halle may primarily realise horizontal synergies. Moreover, the two cities are related to logistics and land transport. This is due to the endowment with several motorways. Differences between the cities for example trace back to the role of motor vehicles (BWM and Porsche manufacture in Leipzig) and food production and beverage, which holds a stronger position in Halle.
On the contrary, the cities Dresden and Chemnitz have a more distinct profile. Dresden, already a centre of the microelectronics industry during GDR-times, is specialised on electronics, manufacture of electrical and optical equipment as well as electrical machinery and apparatus. Chemnitz shows similar traditions. The specialisation on the manufacture of textiles and the manufacture of machinery and equipment outlasted the process of economic transformation. In addition, Dresden is the capital of the federal state Saxony and therefore has a strong position in public administration. Due to its location at the river Elbe, Dresden shows the strongest specialisation on water transport. 
Innovative Competencies
Besides differentiation in the economic structures, different competencies in technological fields can be regarded as a further source of complementarity. To indicate the innovative competencies of the cities, the number of patent applications in the period from 2000 to 2005 is used (German Patent and Trademark Office 2006). The statistic differs between 31 technological fields, whereas each technological field includes several classes from the International Patent Classification (IPC). Due to the availability of data, the analysis is carried out on spatial planning regions, which covers the urban areas and the surrounding rural districts. We presume, that a spatial planning region has specific innovative competency in a technological field, if the number of patent applications exceeds the number of 50 (Franz 2007 ).
The range of innovative competencies differs between the cities of the 'Saxony Triangle' (see Table 3 in the appendix, which presents the number of patent applications in the different technological fields in the 'Saxony Triangle'). While in the spatial planning region including the city of Dresden about 3,500 patent applications are registered, the areas of the other cities drop behind (Chemnitz 1,300 patent applications, Leipzig 900, Halle 700 
Conclusions
In Germany the initial impulse by the EU to identify metropolitan regions at the national level, and to make them capable of acting, especially in converting their endogenous potentials into a surplus of economic growth, led to political activities for region-building in eleven cases. The state of progress made on the political level in direction to this goal differs between the involved regions and is, at least partially, dependent on some framing conditions. In the case of the 'Saxony Triangle' its polycentric structure, the existence of Länder borderlines within the territory of the region, and special conditions tracing back to the re-unification and the economic transition in the 90s have contributed to a relatively slow pace in the process of institutionalising it as a metropolitan region. In addition to this the initiators of the 'Saxony Triangle' have to come to terms with a competing regional demarcation named 'region Central Germany' that is supported by a number of important enterprises and business associations in the region. Altogether, in the case of the 'Saxony Triangle' the main outcome up to now is a wellestablished network of (few) cities, but with little reach beyond the city level.
Besides the dimension of politics, metropolitan regions may manifest through complementary structures in the field of business and technology. Although the cities of the 'Saxony Triangle' have distinct economic profiles and show an increasing variety in their economic structure in recent years, it remains unclear in which extent the potentials for complementarity are realised. Thereby the valuation of the extent of economic differentiation is hindered, because of the small number of existing comparable studies. Further research should be of comparative nature, to allow a valuation of the degree of economic integration of different metropolitan areas. In particular, a comparison between polycentric and monocentric metropolitan regions regarding their potential complementarity could provide insights into the working of urbanised regions.
Beyond its significance as information about the degree of the cities' economic specialisation and division of labour, the empirical results in Section 4 also are of importance for strategic political action. The spatial concentration of some industries within the metropolitan region may, for instance, become a starting point for strategic realignment of universities by strengthening those fields of study that are relevant for R&D and for the specific human capital demanded by the firms of those industries. To handle decisions of this kind, e.g., strengthening the capacity of some infrastructure at the expense of some other one, a relatively high level of trust between the actors of a metropolitan region is required. The solutions for these win-lose-situations have to be negotiated and cannot be decided upon by mere political power. This bears the risk that the new and fragile 'culture of cooperation' in a metropolitan region would be damaged and future compromise solutions based on cooperation be prevented. A potential way to negotiate such win-lose-situations successfully might be to endow the municipalities engaged in metropolitan region-building from the start with 'transferable development rights' (Frey and Zimmermann 2005) . The amount of these rights might be calculated according to
